Individual pension risk preference elicitation and collective asset allocation with heterogeneity by Alserda, G.A.G. (Gosse) et al.
Journal of Banking and Finance 101 (2019) 206–225 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Journal of Banking and Finance 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf 
Individual pension risk preference elicitation and collective asset 
allocation with heterogeneity  
Gosse A.G. Alserda a , Benedict G.C. Dellaert a , b , Laurens Swinkels a , ∗, Fieke S.G. van der Lecq c 
a Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burgermeester Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam 3062PA, The Netherlands 
b Monash Business School, Monash University, Australia 
c School of Business and Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 23 June 2016 
Accepted 18 February 2019 
Available online 21 February 2019 
JEL classiﬁcation: 
D14 
G11 
G23 
Keywords: 
Risk preference elicitation 
Composite score 
Pension fund 
Asset allocation 
a b s t r a c t 
Collectively organized pension plans must increasingly demonstrate that the risk preferences of their 
members are adequately reﬂected in the plans’ asset allocations. However, whether funds should elicit 
individual members’ risk preferences to achieve this goal, or whether they can rely on other indicators, 
such as socio-demographics, remains unclear. To address this question, we apply a tailored augmented 
lottery choice method to elicit individual pension income risk preferences from 7894 members from ﬁve 
different pension plans. The results show that member risk preferences are strongly heterogeneous and 
can only partially be predicted from individual and plan characteristics. Differences in risk preference im- 
ply different optimal asset allocations. We ﬁnd large welfare losses for heterogeneous members in pen- 
sion plans with their current asset allocation because these allocations are safer than implied by mem- 
bers’ preferences. We provide a framework for pension plans to gauge the need to elicit risk preferences 
among their members. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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c  1. Introduction 
Pension capital is a major component of savings for many
individuals worldwide, and pension funds are some of the
largest investors in the world, with considerable impact on stock
markets ( Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, 2015b ). The investment decisions of pension funds also im-
pact the retirement income of large segments of the population
( Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015a ).
Optimal pension asset allocation is a rigorous ﬁnancial optimiza-
tion process that takes into account projected retirement ages and
desired replacement ratios, among others. For individual retire-
ment accounts, the members themselves are responsible for pro-
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here members are forced to share the same asset allocation, the
oard of trustees is responsible for ensuring that the pension plan
sset allocation adequately reﬂects the collective risk attitude of its
embers. This requirement is challenging, because the risk prefer-
nces of members are not directly observable. Moreover the mea-
urement of risk preferences can be noisy ( Dave et al., 2010 ). The
hallenges in accurately measuring risk preferences could be why,
s far as we know, risk preference measurements have hardly been
sed as input to determine pension plan asset allocation. The little
esearch that has been done has measured substantially lower lev-
ls of risk aversion when directly eliciting pension members’ pref-
rences through surveys, than the level of risk aversion used when
alibrating optimal pension asset allocations ( Mankiw and Zeldes,
991; Barsky et al., 1997 ). Therefore, pension funds currently lack
 clear basis for determining whether they should elicit individ-
al members’ risk preferences, or whether they can rely on other
ndicators such as sociodemographics. In addition, it is not clear
hat the welfare loss is when individuals are forced into a collec-
ive pension asset allocation that does not match their risk prefer-
nces. We aim to ﬁll both gaps in the literature. 
Doing so is important because the literature shows substantial
eterogeneity in (investment) risk preferences among individuals
e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison et al., 2007; Paravisini et al.,nder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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1 See, for example, the Deﬁned Ambition Research Brieﬁng (September 2014) 
in the UK House of Commons Library: http://researchbrieﬁngs.parliament.uk/ 
ResearchBrieﬁng/Summary/SN06902 or Pension & Investments (December 2016), 
“Germany gearing up for new mandatory DC plan: Proposal borrows much from 
collective hybrid system of the Netherlands.”017 ). Moreover, the current pension asset allocation models, such
s those of Campbell et al. (2003) , and Viceira (2001) show that
isk preferences are an important input for optimal asset alloca-
ion. However, despite this research, Clark and Bennett (2001) and
rijns (2010) ﬁnd that many pension funds pool investments such
hat everyone has the same asset allocation, which clearly ignores
eterogeneity in risk preferences. such allocation could be optimal
n the case of pure deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) schemes, where all invest-
ent risks are borne by the employer(s) and the pensions are risk-
ree for the fund members. However, it is likely to be detrimental
o members in the case of collective deﬁned contribution (CDC),
n which case the members bear the risk of investment and the
ollectively set asset allocation might not match members’ risk
references. Heterogeneity creates a two sources of welfare loss for
ndividual members: First, collective welfare loss arises when a col-
ective asset allocation does not match the population’s (average)
isk preferences. Second, an individual welfare loss arises because
f heterogeneity in risk preferences between members within the
und. Our results are also important in the case of individual de-
ned contribution (DC) schemes. Individual retirement accounts
ypically offer a collectively set life-cycle asset allocation that is
ge dependent. If the life-cycles are also dependent on pension risk
references, insights from our elicitation method could be used. 
Three factors distinguish the pension domain from other ﬁ-
ance domains, which makes a domain-speciﬁc analysis of how in-
ividuals’ risk preferences affect optimal asset allocation especially
elevant. First, choices in pension plans are mostly made by delega-
ion. Pension plan members need not to have the ﬁnancial literacy
ecessary to make adequate choices for retirement savings (e.g.,
usardi and Mitchell, 2007; Balloch et al., 2014 ). Nevertheless, their
references should be taken into account in pension scheme de-
ign. This calls for an instrument that measures member risk pref-
rences, without being too demanding. Second, state pensions and
ncome taxes can inﬂuence pension asset allocation ( Fischer and
ensen, 2015 ). This calls for a contextual analysis of individuals’ risk
references. Third, in many countries pension plan participation
s mandatory, such as through collective labor agreements. Since
embers cannot exit these pension plans, their preferences should
e incorporated to keep the pension system sustainable. In addi-
ion, risk preferences are domain dependent, meaning that indi-
iduals have different risk preferences depending on the domain
o which the choice refers ( Weber et al., 2002; Van Rooij et al.,
007 ). Pensions are cognitively classiﬁed as a separate risk-decision
omain by individuals, and ﬁnancial risk aversion is higher in the
ension domain than in other ﬁnancial domains ( Van Rooij et al.,
007 ). This implies that risk preferences should be elicited within
he context of the pension domain to be relevant to pension fund
ecision making. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we design a
ovel questionnaire to measure risk preferences in the pension do-
ain and relate the responses of pension scheme members to their
ocio-demographic characteristics. Second, we analyze the welfare
ains of allowing pension fund members an asset allocation that
s different from the average of the pension fund. Despite research
n the investment consequences of pension plan age heterogene-
ty ( Bikker et al., 2012; Molenaar and Ponds, 2012 ), the extent to
hich allowing for pension plan member risk preference hetero-
eneity will affect optimal asset allocation in real-world settings
emains unclear. 
These real-world settings are changing, since many sponsors are
hifting from DB plans to DC or CDC plans. CDC plans are some-
imes also called deﬁned ambition, since sponsors do not make
xtra contributions in cases of funding rate deﬁcit. In CDC plans,
he investments are made collectively and individuals are not al-
owed personal asset allocations. However, the collective asset allo-
ation should reﬂect the demands of the fund population, in termsf both age and risk preferences. By implication, the elicitation of
isk preferences is useful in collective plans as well, as long as the
embers are exposed to investment risk. This is the very setting in
hich we conducted our surveys: CDC plans in which plan mem-
ers are exposed to investment risk. Although such CDC plans are
ost widespread in the Netherlands, we note that they are also
ell known in the United Kingdom, as well as in European Union
ember states that want to enhance their second pillar. 1 A de-
cription of the three pillars is provided in Appendix A . 
We use unique data from 7894 members in ﬁve Dutch pen-
ion plans that completed our novel questionnaire to assess the
alue of matching asset allocations to individual risk preferences.
ur augmented lottery choice method is tailored to individual pen-
ion risk preference elicitation. Lottery choice questions ( Holt and
aury, 2002 ) are personalized to each individual’s pension income
ased on current income to accurately reﬂect risk return trade-offs.
he augmented lottery choice method combines information from
ottery choices with the observations of two other risk preference
licitation methods ( Van Rooij et al., 2007; Kapteyn and Teppa,
011 ) to reduce the level of measurement noise in the risk pref-
rence measure. 
This augmented lottery choice method allows us to determine
he pension plan population characteristics and assumed equity
remiums for which individual member pension risk preferences
hould be elicited to ensure an adequate ﬁt between pension plan
sset allocation and member preferences. This question is vital
rom both a pension fund and a societal perspective, because sub-
tantial retirement welfare losses can affect pension plan mem-
ers if there is a mismatch between their risk preferences and the
lan’s asset allocation. This can imply, for example, that members
ncur a greater risk of a low pension income than they wish to
ave or that they will lose out on an equity premium they would
refer to have. However, when the impact on asset allocation is
mall, pension funds can largely ignore differences in preferences
mong members in plan asset allocation, saving on costly, time-
onsuming risk preference elicitation. 
. A novel measure for eliciting pension plan member risk 
references 
During their working lives, pension plan members contribute
 substantial proportion of their incomes to pension capital. The
ptimal asset allocation for an individual depends, among other
hings, on the individual’s risk preferences ( Bodie et al., 1992; Vi-
eira, 2001; Campbell et al., 2003 ). Research shows that individ-
als differ signiﬁcantly in terms of how they trade off (expected)
eturns with risk in ﬁnancial investments ( Tversky and Kahneman,
992; Holt and Laury, 2002; Weber et al., 2002 ). Therefore, mem-
ers are likely to also differ in terms of the extent to which they
rade off (expected) pension beneﬁts and the riskiness of those
eneﬁts. This implies that the optimal pension asset allocation
ikely differs among members. 
In this paper we explicitly model pension members’ norma-
ive risk preferences. Normative risk preferences can deviate from
evealed risk preferences due to well described measurement ir-
egularities, such as probability weighting, loss aversion and the
eﬂection effect ( Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Bleichrodt et al.,
001; Beshears et al., 2008 ). The elicitation methods are selected
o minimize measurement biases (e.g., by avoiding certainty ef-
ects), but we do not adjust the results in order to address pos-
208 G.A.G. Alserda, B.G.C. Dellaert and L. Swinkels et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance 101 (2019) 206–225 
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p  sible behavioral effects, since that would lead to many arbitrary
choices. Behavioral effects are minimized by combining multiple
elicitation methods in the composite score, which is the measure
of risk preferences that combines the information of the different
elicitation methods. Our results use expected utility (EU) with con-
stant relative risk aversion (RRA) as the preferred model for nor-
mative risk preference. Although EU is generally accepted as the
model for normative risk preferences ( Quiggin, 2012 ), it does not
always match actual behavior, such as stock market nonparticipa-
tion ( Ang et al., 2005 ). To explain revealed preferences, other util-
ity functions can be used, including behavioral effects such as loss
aversion ( Benartzi and Thaler, 1995 ). We leave examination of the
impact of applying these more behavioral models on optimal pen-
sion asset allocation to future research. 
To express the risk preferences of members, we construct
a pension-speciﬁc metric based on individuals’ constant 2 RRA
( γ ) coeﬃcient, a common ﬁnancial measure of risk preferences
( Chiappori and Paiella, 2011 ). This metric expresses how risk averse
an individual is with respect to pension wealth or retirement in-
come. It captures risk aversion in a single coeﬃcient, that is inde-
pendent of an individual’s wealth and can be easily used to assess
distributions of pension outcomes. 
Positive values of γ indicate risk aversion, and negative values
indicate risk-seeking. A value equal to zero indicates risk neutrality.
Individuals who are more risk averse require higher return premi-
ums before they are willing to accept a risky investment. In the EU
framework, risk aversion depends on the concavity of the utility
function ( Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965 ), and can therefore be deﬁned
as: 
γi = P i ∗
−U ′′ (P i ) 
U ′ (P 1 ) 
(1)
where γ i is the (constant) RRA and P i is the pension income of
individual i , and U ′ and U ′′ are the ﬁrst and second derivatives,
respectively, of U , which is the pension income utility function. 
From expression (1) , it is clear that the value of γ depends on
the shape of the utility function. To infer preferences for pension
risk from observed risky decisions (e.g., lottery choices), we use the
following power utility function ( Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison
et al., 2007 ): 
 i (P i ) = 
P 
1 −γi 
i 
1 − γi 
(2)
where U i is the utility, P i is the pension income, and γ i is the (con-
stant) RRA for individual i . 
Next, EU can be used to compare different asset allocation op-
tions for each individual. The EU of an asset allocation is obtained
by multiplying the utility of each outcome by the probability of
that outcome. The option that has the highest EU represents the
option that provides the highest utility to an individual, on aver-
age over possible outcomes, given the individual’s RRA. 
This approach provides pension plan managers a metric to cal-
culate the ﬁt between the pension plan’s asset allocation and
members’ risk preferences, if these preferences are known. Man-
agers tend to make investment decisions primarily on the basis
of performance targets ( March and Shapira, 1987 ). These perfor-
mance targets might not (perfectly) represent the members’ risk
preferences. To avoid this potential mismatch, supervisors, such as
central banks, are increasingly demanding that pension plan man-
agers ensure that their asset allocation adequately reﬂects individ-
ual pension plan members’ risk preferences ( Rozinka and Tapia,
2007; Frijns, 2010; European Insurance and Occupational Pensions2 Although RRA is ex ante assumed to be constant with income/wealth, we do 
add income in a regression to try to explain risk aversion. 
s  
t  
s  
t  uthority, 2013 ). Pension plan managers can match asset alloca-
ion to members’ risk preferences only if their risk preferences are
nown. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether plan managers should
licit individual members’ risk preferences as input in this process
r whether they can rely on other indicators, such as sociodemo-
raphics and industry employment to project member risk prefer-
nces ( Bikker et al., 2012 ). To disentangle the determinants of pen-
ion risk preferences, we develop a measurement instrument for
ndividuals’ risk preferences tailored to the pension domain and
bserve the heterogeneity in members’ preferences in ﬁve Dutch
ension plans, which are connected to different pension funds. 
The elicitation of risk preferences in this study expands
nd tailors the traditional multiple lottery choice (MLC) method
 Binswanger, 1980; Holt and Laury, 2002 ). The MLC method is
 well-accepted risk preference elicitation method ( Pennings and
midts, 20 0 0; Andersen et al., 20 06; Harrison et al., 20 07; Dohmen
t al., 2011 ). It introduces a series of choices between two lotter-
es. Both lotteries have a good and a bad state, with equal prob-
bilities of realizing either state for each question. The lotteries
iffer in their dispersion: the “safe” lottery has outcomes that do
ot deviate much, while there are large differences between the
ood and bad states for the “so-called risky” lottery. For the ﬁrst
uestion (see Fig. 1 ), the probability of the good state is low, mak-
ng the safe lottery dominant for all except extremely risk-seeking
ndividuals. In subsequent questions, the probability of the good
tate increases, gradually making the risky lottery more attrac-
ive. The higher an individual’s risk aversion, the more questions
t will take before the individual switches from the safe to the
isky lottery. To accept the bad state of the risky lottery, risk-averse
ndividuals demand a higher risk premium, which is deﬁned as
he difference between the expected values of the risky and safe
otteries. 
Although the MLC method is well accepted and frequently used,
t is cognitively demanding for the respondents. At least four chal-
enges need to be addressed. First, the results from this method
re often noisy, since members ﬁnd it diﬃcult to choose their pre-
erred trade-off when utility differences are small, and the results
end to depend on the exact framing of the question. Second, a
ubstantial number of respondents are found to choose a domi-
ated option, that is, an option that has lower outcomes in both
tates of the world. Third, the RRA results of previous studies are
imited to ranges rather than to a speciﬁc point, as necessary in
sset allocation. Finally, previous studies are not linked to the pen-
ion domain and are not related to respondent income ( Holt and
aury, 2002; Harrison et al., 2007; Dave et al., 2010 ). For pen-
ions, this is a prerequisite, because of the domain dependency of
isk preferences. In particular, individuals have different risk pref-
rences depending on the domain of the risky choice ( Weber et al.,
002; Van Rooij et al., 2007 ). 
In our study, we tailor the MLC method to the pension domain
nd propose to augment its results with information from addi-
ional measures to overcome the previously mentioned concerns
i.e., domain dependency, measurement noise, and cognitive chal-
enges that lead to the selection of dominated options). First, the
mounts involved in both lotteries relate to the pension domain
re denoted in local monetary units, that is, euros, include the
tate old age pension, and are after tax. The amounts presented
o the respondents are derived from their monthly incomes and
re either 60% (bad state) or 70% (good state) of their current net
ncome for the safe lottery and 40% (bad state) or 90% (good state)
f their current net income for the risky lottery. The state’s old age
ension and taxes are included in these amounts resemble actual
ituations as closely as possible. An example of the resulting ques-
ion, converted to U.S. dollars, is presented in Fig. 1 . This repre-
entation is the result of various testing rounds, that showed that
his visual representation led to the best understanding among re-
G.A.G. Alserda, B.G.C. Dellaert and L. Swinkels et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance 101 (2019) 206–225 209 
Fig. 1. Example of adjusted MLC question. 
Notes: Example for a member with a net monthly income of $2,150. This example represents the ﬁrst choice out of a sequence of 10 in which the probability (bold) 
systematically increases for the additional pension income. The currency of the Netherlands is Euro, which is used throughout the questionnaire. Here, we convert all 
amounts to U.S. Dollars. 
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Table 1 
Adaptation of the Holt and Laury MLC method. 
Number Equal to switch-point Range of 
of with probability relative risk aversion 
safe choices of good state for U i (P i ) = P 1 −γi i / 1 − γi 
0 10% γ < −4 . 82 
1 20% −4 . 82 < γ < −3 . 00 
2 30% −3 . 00 < γ < −1 . 82 
3 40% −1 . 82 < γ < −0 . 86 
4 50% −0 . 86 < γ < 0 . 00 
5 60% 0.00 < γ < 0.85 
6 70% 0.85 < γ < 1.76 
7 80% 1.76 < γ < 2.85 
8 90% 2.85 < γ < 4.46 
9–10 100% 4.46 < γ
Notes: Ranges of RRA scores depending on the number of safe 
choices / switch-point. 
l  pondents. However, that does not mean that our representation is
ptimal. We leave improvements on the visual aspects of our ques-
ionnaire for future research. 
When the respondent chooses Plan B, the MLC is ﬁnished.
hen the respondent chooses Plan A, the next question looks the
ame as in Fig. 1 but the probability increases from 10% to 20%.
ach possible switch-point in the MLC method corresponds to an
RA range. This range can be obtained by calculating, for each
hoice, the RRA value that makes an individual indifferent between
he two options. Assuming a power utility function ( Eq. (2) ) and
inear probability weighting yields a closed-form solution that can
e easily solved ( Holt and Laury, 2002 ). The RRA range for a given
witch-point is then the range between the point of indifference
or the last choice of the safe lottery and the point of indifference
or the ﬁrst choice of the risky lottery. 3 The results of these cal-
ulations are presented in Table 1 and are irrespective of income,
ince the options are constant shares of income. 
Next, in line with Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) , the results
rom the MLC method are combined with the results from two3 Later, we transform the composite pension risk scores back to RRA levels. For 
hat step, we use speciﬁc values of the RRA instead of ranges. To obtain these val- 
es, we simulate for each individual a speciﬁc RRA within the range from a uniform 
istribution. For the one open interval with an RRA above 4.46, we use a recursive 
ethod to determine the distribution of RRA levels in the tail. We ﬁrst calculate 
he mean and standard deviation of the RRA levels when the entire distribution is 
oncentrated at the minimum RRA of 4.46. We then use this standard deviation to 
reate a normal distribution in the tail beyond 4.46. However, since the estimated 
tandard deviation was underestimated in the ﬁrst step, we re-estimate it and cal- 
ulate the tail distribution with this new and somewhat higher standard deviation. 
e repeat this process until convergence is obtained. The stopping criterion is set 
o be that the change from the re-estimation is smaller than 0.0 0 0 01% of the stan- 
ard deviation. 
a  
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m  
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w
T
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o
aess time-consuming and cognitively less demanding questions
bout pension risk preference to form a single composite score
 Van Praag, 1991; Abdellaoui et al., 2011 ). 4 The composite score
hould reduce noise and thus provide more stable measures of
isk preferences ( Ackerman and Cianciolo, 20 0 0 ). Unlike the MLC
ethod, these methods do not involve amounts and probabilities
nd therefore do not allow for computation of an RRA coeﬃcient,
hich are necessary to determine an optimal asset allocation. 4 We also tested an additional question in the survey based on Kapteyn and 
eppa (2011) - “My friends describe me as a careful person” - but the factor analysis 
nd item response analysis showed that this item was not well correlated with the 
ther three measures. Hence, we omitted it from the proposed risk measurement 
pproach. 
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tThe ﬁrst question is a self-description task based on the work
of Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) : “Are you willing to take risk with
your pension?” which is to be answered on a seven point Likert
scale (“completely agree” = 1 to “completely disagree” = 7). The
second question is a simpliﬁed portfolio choice question adjusted
from Van Rooij et al. (2007) , where the respondents must divide
their pension capital between equity (described as risky invest-
ments with an expected return of 6% per annum) and bonds (de-
scribed as savings with a guaranteed return of 2% per annum). We
mention the expected returns explicitly to increase the likelihood
of the respondents’ answers reﬂecting risk aversion and being less
inﬂuenced by ambiguity aversion with respect to their own (con-
ditional) expected returns on stocks and bonds. 
The composite score is formulated as the average of the
standardized risk preferences of all the elicitation methods
( Ackerman and Cianciolo, 20 0 0 ). Factor analysis and item response
theory are used to verify whether all the elicitation methods load
on one common underlying risk preference factor. If a respondent
has failed to respond to one of the elicitation methods, only the
observed values are included in the composite score for that per-
son. The composite measure is thus the average of the standard-
ized elicitation results. 
Since the MLC method is the only method that allows us to
measure risk preferences in terms of RRA, the composite score is
then ﬁtted on the RRA domain by regressing the RRA measure of
the MLC method on the composite score by means of the following
equations: 
MLC 
γ
i 
= α + β ∗Composite i + ε i (3)
̂ MLC 
γ
i = ˆ α + ˆ β ∗Composite i (4)
Where Composite represents the Composite Score ( γ ) and hats
represent estimated values. We assume measurement noise to
be independent and identically distributed. The γ from the aug-
mented MLC, which is based on the regression results without the
error term, will therefore contain substantially less measurement
noise. Hence, we obtain more robust RRA coeﬃcients (i.e., a less
biased and skewed distribution thereof) that can be used to de-
termine the optimal asset allocation for individual pension plan
members. 
3. Empirical assessment of risk preference heterogeneity in the 
pension domain 
Large-scale data collection was conducted to empirically assess
the effect of heterogeneity in risk preference on optimal asset al-
location. Data were collected through an online survey of pension
plan members of ﬁve Dutch company pension funds that all pro-
vide CDC pension schemes. The survey was conducted in the sec-
ond pillar of the pension system, which consists of capital-based
collective pension plans. Most Dutch employees are covered by
such a second pillar pension plan. Participation is mandatory for
those employed in a ﬁrm with a corporate or industry-wide pen-
sion plan. Most pension plans in the Netherlands contain risk-
sharing elements between employer(s) and employees, although
the amount of risk borne by the employee has increased consid-
erably. Strategic pension plan asset allocation is set by the board
of trustees, where pension contributions by the employer and the
employees are traded off against pension outcomes. By implication,
the employees are exposed to investment risk, even though they
cannot determine their individual asset mixes. Appendix A de-
scribes the essential features of the pension system in the Nether-
lands and compares the system with that in the United States
where appropriate. 
Our survey was conducted among members of second pil-
lar pension funds for ﬁve pension funds of similar organizationaltructure but covering members of very different industries, rang-
ng from blue collar to white collar. The survey was administered
n collaboration with a consultancy ﬁrm and sent to several of
ts clients, that is, companies with pension plans administered by
ifferent pension funds. Before the survey was sent out, it was
rst tested using a paper version on a small representative pop-
lation and then tested online with the consultancy ﬁrm’s own
72 employees. After minor adjustments, the questionnaire was
ent to the active members of ﬁve pension plans from ﬁve com-
anies from four industries (transportation, manufacturing, auto-
otive, and leisure). All plan members were invited via regular
ail and/or e-mail, depending on their channel preferences and
he contact possibilities of the companies’ pension funds. The sur-
eys were conducted in the ﬁrst half of 2013. Table 2 contains
ummary data for the aggregate sample and for each pension plan
eparately. 
The response rate is on average 14.1%, and varies between 5.5%
nd 42.4%. Differences in response rate could be due to the method
f inviting respondents and company efforts in requesting that
embers complete the survey. Invitations by regular mail resulted
n markedly lower response rates, and e-mail reminders sent out
y the employer increased response rates. Members were not paid
nd did not receive other forms of compensation for completing
he questionnaire. Although the questions were not directly incen-
ivized, pension funds indicated in the invitation that the results
ould be taken into account for future decisions, so participation
n the survey was consequential. 
Men were more likely to ﬁll out the questionnaire for each of
he ﬁve pension plans. On average, our sample consists of 82%
en, while the population has 69% men. Note that the ﬁrst three
ension plans have primarily a male workforce, whereas the fourth
as a female workforce. The respondents are also slightly older
han the nonresponders for four out of ﬁve pension plans, with
n average age of 50.1 years for the responders, while the popu-
ation average is 47.8 years old. For two of the pension plans, the
opulation average income is available. The respondents’ income
s slightly higher for the third pension plan, and slightly lower for
he ﬁfth pension plan, compared to their population averages. We
ave no information on the education level of the population, so
e cannot determine whether there is over- or underrepresenta-
ion. In summary, our response rate is high, there is substantial
ariation across pension plans, and the sample of respondents does
ot exhibit substantial selection bias. 
.1. Empirical assessment of risk preferences in the pension domain 
The questions that we asked relate to the risk pension mem-
ers are willing to take with their pension income, including so-
ial security, after retirement. The reason for this approach is that
t not only relates to the cognitive capabilities of the respondents
o mentally separate out these pension components but also re-
ects that it is their total pension income and not the source of the
ension income that is relevant to their consumption. By implica-
ion, the asset allocation for the second pillar pension plan needs
o be calculated after deducting the expected ﬁrst pillar pension
ncome, which we treat as certain since it is provided for by the
overnment. Our model allows us to calculate differences between
utcomes based on the pension asset allocations that are the same
or all members in a plan, and pension asset allocations that are
ailored to individuals’ estimated risk preferences. We can thus in-
er the welfare loss of being forced into an asset allocation that
oes not match an individual’s risk attitude. The caveat remains
hat these statements are conditional on the simulation model that
e use for the assets and the utility framework that we assume
he member to have. 
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Table 2 
Summary data. 
Pension plan 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Response Sample 5094 1176 873 437 314 7894 
Total 29,738 11,093 2057 8015 4211 55,114 
Response rate 17.1% 10.6% 42.4% 5.5% 7.5% 13.3% 
Gender = man Sample 86% 90% 80% 25% 66% 82% 
Total 78% 85% 76% 20% 55% 69% 
Average age Sample 50.1 53.8 44.8 52.2 48.5 50.1 
Total 47.4 51.3 45.1 47.6 43.1 47.8 
Average monthly income Sample $2537 $2097 $2168 $1813 $2498 $2396 
Total – – $1898 – $2648 –
Average education Sample 3.8 3.0 3.5 4.5 4.1 3.7 
Has partner Sample 86.5% 87.6% 84.1% 80.1% 80.9% 85.8% 
Home-owner Sample 86.3% 76.9% 82.0% 81.2% 84.4% 84.3% 
Notes: Number of observations, response rates, % men, average age, average monthly net income, av- 
erage education (education ranging from 1 (attended primary education) to 6 (attended university)), 
% with partner, and % that owns a house for total population of the pension plan and the sample of 
respondents. 
Table 3 
Responses to elicitation methods. 
Multiple lottery Stated risk aversion Bond allocation Composite measure 
Safe γ Freq. % Likert Freq. % Alloca- Freq. % γ Freq. % 
choices scale tion(%) 
0 −∞ −4.8 1243 15.8 Seeking 0 42 1.3 −∞ −4.8 0 0,0 
1 −4.8 −3.0 207 2.6 1 150 1.9 10 25 0.8 −4.8 −3.0 9 0.1 
2 −3.0 −1.8 213 2.7 2 508 6.4 20 90 2.8 −3.0 −1.9 153 1.9 
3 −1.8 −0.9 428 5.4 3 1665 21.1 30 175 5.4 −1.9 −0.9 429 5.4 
4 −0.9 0.0 712 9.0 4 1208 15.3 40 271 8.4 −0.9 0.0 688 8.7 
5 0.0 0.9 779 9.9 5 1647 20.9 50 668 20.6 0.0 0.9 1176 14.9 
6 0.9 1.8 1113 14.1 6 1686 21.4 60 349 10.8 0.9 1.8 1211 15.3 
7 1.8 2.9 1157 14.7 7 1012 12.8 70 456 14.1 1.8 2,9 1612 20.4 
8 2.9 4.5 669 8.5 Averse 80 404 12.5 2.9 4.5 1704 21.6 
9 4.5 ∞ 1188 15.1 90 322 9.9 4.5 ∞ 912 11.6 
10 177 2.2 100 435 13.4 
Total 7886 100 Total 7876 100 Total 3327 100 Total 7894 100 
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i  Respondents’ risk preferences were elicited using three differ-
nt risk elicitation methods: the MLC method, the Likert scale self-
escription method, and the portfolio choice method. The mea-
ures varied in their level of complexity and practical usage. The
ore complicated MLC method might yield noisier results, but is
ess likely to lead to socially desirable answers. The MLC is also the
nly one question from which we can back out RRA coeﬃcients
hat can be used as an input parameter for optimal asset alloca-
ion. 
Table 3 presents the results from each of the individual ques-
ions and the composite measure that we constructed. In con-
rast to the other methods, the question regarding preferred bond
llocation was not set to be required to answer, which resulted
n roughly half of the responses. The group of nonresponders to
his question did not answer other questions substantially differ-
nt from the group of responders. 
The empirical evidence in the ﬁrst columns of Table 3 suggests
hat some of respondents had diﬃculty with the MLC question,
ince 2.2% of the respondents chose the dominated answer of 10
afe choices. This is comparable to other applications ( Holt and
aury, 2002 ); however, it suggests that a few respondents did not
ully understand the question or did not spend enough time on an-
wering it. This indicates that using information from other, possi-
ly easier to answer questions relating to risk aversion in the pen-
ion domain, can increase the reliability of the results. 
Since only ﬁve of the safe choices correspond to risk aversion,
e see that about 35% were categorized as risk seeking in answer-
ng the MLC question, with a peak for the ﬁrst answer at 15.8%.
erhaps some of these most risk-seeking respondents did not in-
erpret the question correctly. Therefore, we disregard the MLCnswers with zero safe choices and instead use imputed values
ased on the respondents’ sociodemographic information. The fre-
uency distribution also suggests that more granularity at higher
isk aversion levels could have been better, since the number of re-
pondents with six to nine safe choices does not seem to decrease.
oreover, the current asset allocations of the pension funds in our
ample correspond to levels of RRA above 4.5. Based on our sur-
ey results, participants would, on average, be better off if pension
unds increased their collective equity allocations. 
The pension asset allocation question indicates that many
embers are willing to take on risk, since about 35% is willing to
nvest 80% or more in equities. The question about stated risk aver-
ion might be the least cognitively demanding, but could also lead
o socially desirable answers. At least in this case, we see that most
f the answers are in the range four to six, suggesting moderate
o high risk aversion. Even though all the columns in Table 3 are
orted with the most risk-seeking answers at the top, the rows do
ot necessarily correspond to the same risk preferences. For exam-
le, the ﬁrst ﬁve choices of the MLC method differentiate between
isk-seeking individuals, who, by nature, should allocate 100% of
heir ﬁnancial wealth to equities. 
We employ a principal component analysis, which shows that
he MLC method, the pension-related self-description question, and
he portfolio choice method load on a common factor (with fac-
or loadings of 0.87, 0.82, and 0.50, respectively, together explain-
ng 57.8% of the variation). In addition, Table 4 shows the results
f item response theory analysis. The results show that all three
ethods are positively correlated to the latent variable, but to dif-
erent degrees. The self-description question has greater discrim-
native power (are less noisy) and are more strongly correlated
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Table 4 
Item response theory and correlation matrix. 
Item response theory results Correlation matrix 
Measure Discrimination Diﬃculty (range) θ IRT MLC Stated aversion Allocation to bonds 
min max 
MLC 0.724 −2.582 2.362 0.316 1.0 0 0 
(0.026) (0.093) (0.089) 
Stated aversion 4.649 −2.227 1.220 0.972 0.255 1.0 0 0 
(0.389) (0.042) (0.023) 
Allocation to bonds 1.876 −3.082 1.510 0.744 0.162 0.615 1.0 0 0 
(0.073) (0.115) (0.048) 
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t  with the estimated latent variable. This positive but not perfect
correlation is indicative of the added value of a composite mea-
sure that combines simpler (more reliable) and more demanding
questions. The results of the principal component analysis and the
item response theory analysis suggest that the methods describe
a common latent variable, which we feel comfortable deﬁning as
risk aversion. Noise present in the measurement of risk prefer-
ences is reduced by combining the information from these three
questions. 5 This approach allows us to combine the three elici-
tation methods into a single composite score, scaled to RRA (see
Section 2 ). The resulting values of the rescaled composite score are
presented in Table 3 . Histograms of the composite score per pen-
sion plan are shown in Appendix B . 
We ﬁnd RRAs with a mean value of 1.926 and a standard
deviation of 1.901. This mean value is categorized by Holt and
Laury (2002) as indicating high risk aversion. This result conﬁrms
the ﬁndings of Van Rooij et al. (2007) , who ﬁnd that risk pref-
erences are relatively high in the pension domain. However, note
that. in the optimal asset allocation literature, typically higher lev-
els of risk aversion are needed to explain observed asset alloca-
tions in practice. For example, Viceira (2001) life-cycle asset allo-
cation model uses coeﬃcients of RRA ranging from one to 10. 6 The
standard deviation of 1.901 indicates that individuals are strongly
heterogeneous in their degrees of risk aversion. We now examine
whether this heterogeneity can be explained by sociodemographic
characteristics. 
3.2. Drivers of heterogeneity in pension risk preferences 
We analyze the extent to which the observed heterogeneity
in pension risk preferences is predictable from directly observable
member characteristics. If the heterogeneity can be explained, pen-
sion scheme trustees could use these easily available characteris-
tics instead of sending out questionnaires as we did. Based on the
literature, our prior is that it is diﬃcult to accurately predict risk
preferences, since a substantial amount is diﬃcult to measure, it
being either inherited or acquired ( Cesarini et al., 2009 ). 
We use an ordinary least squares regression model with the re-
sults of the separate elicitation methods, including the compos-
ite score as the dependent variable, expressed in terms of RRA
when applicable, and a set of sociodemographic characteristics. The
estimation results are presented in Table 5 . We include pension
plan dummies as independent variables to represent the current
pension system where asset allocation differs only across pension
plans, not members. The ﬁrst part of each method shows that risk
preferences do seem to vary across pension plans, ranging from an5 In other ﬁelds of ﬁnance the use of composite scores to reduce noise is also 
quite common. For example: Bekaert et al. (2009) use principal component analysis 
to reduce country industry-level stock returns to three global and local factors and 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) use the ﬁrst principal component of a number of noisy 
proxies for investor sentiment to create a sentiment index. 
6 Note that they also use a risk aversion coeﬃcient of 50 0 0 to show the limiting 
case with minimum risk. 
c  
m  
a  
b  
i  
a  
A  verage of 1.83 for the ﬁrst and numeraire pension plan to 2.41
or the fourth pension plan in the case of the composite score.
n addition to differences in the average level of risk preferences,
eterogeneity levels within plans also seem to differ. The stan-
ard deviation of the composite score ranges from 1.65 for the
hird plan to 2.01 for the second plan. We thus observe signiﬁcant
ifferences between the risk preferences of different pension plan
opulations. 
Adding sociodemographic information substantially increases
he explanatory power of the model, with an increase in R 2 for
he composite measure, from 0.007 to 0.056, and reduces the ef-
ect of the pension plan dummies. Table 5 indicates that RRA is
egatively correlated with income and positively with age, in line
ith the results of Watson and McNaughton (2007) . The quadratic
erms suggest that both effects decline with higher levels of in-
ome and age, respectively. Men and home-owners are, on aver-
ge, less risk averse, while having a partner is positively correlated
ith RRA. Finally, higher levels of education correspond to lower
evels of RRA. Due to the addition of sociodemographic informa-
ion, the coeﬃcients of the pension plan dummies are reduced
nd only the coeﬃcient of the ﬁfth plan remains signiﬁcant. The
ifferences between pension plans populations therefore mainly
riginate from differences in sociodemographic compositions of
he population and less from potential risk preference selection
ffects. 
The empirical evidence presented here is consistent with the
otion that heterogeneity in risk preferences is mainly present at
he individual member level and to a far lesser extent at the pen-
ion plan level. Note that R 2 increases from 0.008 to 0.017 when
ociodemographic measures are added to the pension plan dum-
ies for the MLC, whereas it increases to 0.056 for our composite
easure. Although the composite measure reduces noise, there is
till an enormous amount of variation left to explain. This unex-
lained variation is only slightly higher than for the two less cogni-
ively demanding questions. However, our analysis cannot rule out
hat remaining noise is responsible for the observed heterogeneity
t the individual level. 
One of our contributions to the literature is to empirically
emonstrate heterogeneity in risk preferences both within pen-
ion plans and between the populations of different pension plans.
oreover, we show that only some of this heterogeneity can be
redicted using sociodemographic information. A substantial pro-
ortion of the heterogeneity at the individual level is unexplained,
ither because it is unobservable (inherited or acquired) or the re-
ult of measurement noise, even though we try to reduce the lat-
er as much as possible by using a composite measure. Hence, we
onclude that pension plan managers cannot predict pension plan
embers’ risk preferences from sociodemographics alone: they
lso need to elicit the risk preferences directly from the mem-
ers themselves to gain an accurate knowledge of them. By us-
ng our elicitation method, measurement noise is reduced, so that
dditional information on individual risk preference is revealed
lserda (2019) . What the potential effects of this heterogeneity are
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Table 5 
Explaining risk preferences with sociodemographics. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables MLC MLC Stated Stated Allocation Allocation Composite Composite 
γ γ aversion aversion to bonds to bonds γ γ
Constant 1.806 ∗∗∗ −0.450 4.554 ∗∗∗ 5.252 ∗∗∗ 62.378 ∗∗∗ 101.633 ∗∗∗ 1.829 ∗∗∗ 2.284 ∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.754) (0.022) (0.427) (0.655) (9.476) (0.027) (0.517) 
Plan 2 0.119 0.007 0.163 ∗∗∗ −0.045 1.741 −2.030 0.156 ∗∗ −0.070 
(0.088) (0.091) (0.051) (0.051) (1.476) (1.468) (0.061) (0.062) 
Plan 3 0.595 ∗∗∗ 0.562 ∗∗∗ 0.057 −0.104 ∗ 2.742 ∗∗∗ 0.022 0.237 ∗∗∗ 0.058 
(0.099) (0.102) (0.058) (0.058) (1.033) (1.040) (0.069) (0.070) 
Plan 4 0.781 ∗∗∗ 0.472 ∗∗∗ 0.409 ∗∗∗ 0.035 5.288 ∗∗∗ 0.814 0.582 ∗∗∗ 0.125 
(0.135) (0.153) (0.078) (0.087) (1.305) (1.519) (0.094) (0.105) 
Plan 5 −0.168 −0.176 0.439 ∗∗∗ 0.385 ∗∗∗ 6.443 ∗∗∗ 5.728 ∗∗∗ 0.376 ∗∗∗ 0.311 ∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.158) (0.091) (0.089) (1.484) (1.442) (0.110) (0.108) 
Monthly income ($1,0 0 0) −0.259 ∗∗∗ −0.256 ∗∗∗ −3.772 ∗∗∗ −0.327 ∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.044) (0.988) (0.053) 
Monthly income 2 ($1,0 0 0) 0.019 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.206 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.079) (0.004) 
Age 0.114 ∗∗∗ 0.046 ∗∗ −0.350 0.060 ∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.018) (0.402) (0.022) 
Age 2 −0.001 ∗∗∗ −0.0 0 0 ∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.001 ∗∗∗
(0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) (0.004) (0.0 0 0) 
Male −0.178 ∗ −0.437 ∗∗∗ −6.585 ∗∗∗ −0.506 ∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.051) (1.105) (0.062) 
Has partner 0.114 0.107 ∗∗ 0.187 0.143 ∗∗
(0.091) (0.052) (1.141) (0.063) 
Owns house −0.045 −0.214 ∗∗∗ −3.648 ∗∗∗ −0.202 ∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.050) (1.164) (0.060) 
Education 2 0.161 −0.339 ∗∗ −6.413 ∗ −0.248 
(0.259) (0.147) (3.760) (0.178) 
Education 3 0.083 −0.484 ∗∗∗ −9.647 ∗∗∗ −0.423 ∗∗
(0.257) (0.146) (3.724) (0.176) 
Education 4 0.314 −0.505 ∗∗∗ −9.828 ∗∗ −0.357 ∗
(0.270) (0.153) (3.874) (0.185) 
Education 5 0.158 −0.676 ∗∗∗ −13.736 ∗∗∗ −0.583 ∗∗∗
(0.265) (0.150) (3.802) (0.181) 
Education 6 −0.100 −1.011 ∗∗∗ −21.392 ∗∗∗ −1.020 ∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.158) (3.972) (0.191) 
Observations 7894 7894 7876 7876 3237 3237 7894 7894 
R-squared 0.008 0.017 0.007 0.063 0.009 0.091 0.007 0.056 
Notes: Results of regression analysis of observable characteristics on RRA. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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7 Investment experience is not included in the regression with sociodemograph- 
ics, since it is not directly observable to pension plan managers. Knowledge about 
investment experience requires some sort of elicitation. n the asset allocation decisions of pension plan members remains
o be seen. We evaluate this issue in Section 4 . 
Since we have three independent measures of risk aversion in
he pension domain, we can further distinguish between measure-
ent noise around true risk aversion that is fully determined by
ociodemographics and heterogeneity in risk aversion beyond so-
iodemographics. To this end, we choose one risk aversion mea-
ure, normalize it, and regress it on the set of sociodemographic
ariables. The residuals retained from this regression are pure
oise under the null hypothesis that sociodemographics fully de-
ermine risk aversion. Hence, a regression of these residuals on
he average of the two other normalized risk aversion estimates
hould have a zero slope coeﬃcient under the null. However, we
nd a slope coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcantly different from zero,
egardless of which of the three risk measures we start out with
rthogonalizing to our set of sociodemographic variables: 0.26,
.65, and 0.57 (all signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level) for starting with
he MLC, stated aversion, and portfolio choice methods, respec-
ively. The corresponding adjusted R 2 values are 0.06, 0.29, and
.21, demonstrating that a substantial part of the variability is
ue to heterogeneity of risk aversion rather than measurement
oise. 
In addition to the strong result just discussed, four more de-
ailed empirical analyses also indicate that combining elicitation
ethods into a composite score increases the reliability of the risk
reference measure. First, the composite score has a correlation
f −0.17 with investment experience, which we also asked about
n the questionnaire, whereas this correlation is only −0.04 forhe MLC question. 7 Second, the variation (standard deviation) of
isk aversion is 30% lower for the composite score, which likely is
ue to reduced measurement noise. Third, the explanatory power
 R 2 ) of sociodemographics is three times greater for the composite
core than for the MLC method, expressed in terms of RRA. This
esult is consistent with previous research (e.g., Powell and Ansic,
997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998 ), who ﬁnd that these vari-
bles are relevant to risk preferences. Finally, 31% fewer members
ere found to be risk-seeking when the composite score was used.
ince we do not expect many individuals to be risk seeking in the
ension domain, this result is more in line with expected risk pref-
rences in the pension domain. 
. Impact of risk preference heterogeneity on pension asset 
llocation 
Viceira’s (2001) life-cycle model shows that investors with 20
ears to retirement should invest 100% of their ﬁnancial wealth
n stocks when their RRA coeﬃcient equals three, whereas this
ercentage is 52% for a γ of ﬁve, and 28% for a γ of eight.
enzoni et al. (2007) , who consider human capital and equity mar-
ets to be cointegrated, ﬁnd that the optimal asset allocation is
00% stocks for an investor with 20 years to retirement and a risk
214 G.A.G. Alserda, B.G.C. Dellaert and L. Swinkels et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance 101 (2019) 206–225 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
m  
i  
t  
i  
p  
i
 
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
t  
e  
t  
p  
c  
s  
t  
t  
a  
a  
c
 
a  
g  
8 Income in the ﬁrst pillar is equal to $15,752. 
9 The progressive tax brackets are: less than $21,610 at 18.35%, $21,610-$36,911 at 
24,10%, $36,911-$62,184 at 42.00% and above $62,184 at 54.00%. 
10 If R t = 0 , the equation is B = w/L. aversion coeﬃcient of three, around 60% for a risk aversion coef-
ﬁcient of four, and around 40% for a risk aversion coeﬃcient of
ﬁve. Although these are only two of many pension asset allocation
models, it illustrates the importance of risk preferences. Therefore,
if heterogeneity in risk preferences is greater, optimal pension as-
set allocations are likely to be more diverse, increasing the beneﬁts
of eliciting risk preferences. 
Since we ask respondents about their risk preferences with re-
gard to their total pension income, it is important to also include
the social security pension income they expect to receive from the
state. In the Netherlands, ﬁrst pillar social security pension income
is a ﬁxed amount, irrespective of work history. Second pillar oc-
cupational pension schemes are typically deﬁned as top-up on so-
cial security, such that a target pension is reached relative to one’s
average salary. Hence, for low-income workers, the second pillar
pension comprises only a small amount of their total pension in-
come. If we assume that social security pension is safe and there-
fore bond-like, the equity allocation of the relatively small occupa-
tional pension scheme can be 100%, even for risk-averse members.
Since the ﬁrst pillar is a ﬁxed amount, the occupational pension
will be more important for higher-income members. Heterogeneity
in risk preferences therefore has a larger impact for members with
higher a income. More generally, in countries with pension sys-
tems with no or little social security, information about risk pref-
erences is more important for occupational pension scheme asset
allocation. 
The need for risk preference elicitation also depends on the
expected equity premium. This intuition can be obtained from
Merton (1969 , p.251, eq.(29)), who shows that under certain re-
strictions the optimal allocation to risky assets equals the equity
premium divided by the variance of the risky asset multiplied with
the RRA coeﬃcient. A low equity premium makes a portfolio of
predominantly ﬁxed income assets optimal for almost all risk pref-
erences, whereas a high equity premium shifts the allocation to-
ward equities for almost all risk preferences. Pension risk elicita-
tion seems to be the most valuable for cases in between, where
neither ﬁxed income nor equities are dominant due to the ex-
pected equity premium. 
4.1. The simulation model 
Our aim in this section is to analyze the implications of risk
preference heterogeneity on asset allocation. The large number of
variables and time periods makes this optimization problem chal-
lenging to solve analytically. Therefore, we solve it numerically
using a Monte Carlo simulation model ( Dai and Singleton, 2002;
Sangvinatsos and Wachter, 2005 ). This simulation model is built in
the context of an individual DC pension scheme with investment
during retirement. We do not simulate the existing CDC scheme
because it contains the same asset allocation for each individual
and we want to assess the welfare loss from this feature compared
to one in which the asset allocation can differ across individuals.
This choice of a constant asset allocation is motivated by the em-
pirical observations on household portfolio choice of Ameriks and
Zeldes (2004) , who do not ﬁnd support for traditional life cycle
models with bond-like human capital in which the share of equi-
ties declines with age, as Bodie et al. (1992) does, or models with
equity-like human capital, as Benzoni et al. (2007) do. 
The asset return model is taken from Koijen et al. (2010) . This
model has been estimated by Draper (2012, 2014) with data rel-
evant to the Netherlands. The estimated equity risk premium is
replaced by the oﬃcial regulatory equity risk premium in the
Netherlands ( Langejan et al., 2014 ). This model is also used by
the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). A com-
plete description of the model and estimation procedure is given
by Draper (2014) . The simulated asset returns are used to calculate total retire-
ent income (before and after taxes) and occupational pension
ncome (before taxes) separately over 10,0 0 0 scenarios for alloca-
ions of equity from 0% to 100%, in steps of 1%. This simulation
s done for three ages, three (starting) incomes, and three equity
remiums. All outputs are given in annual amounts denominated
n U.S. dollars. 
The main features of the members in our simulation model are
s follows: 
• For simplicity, during an individual’s lifetime, we assume no
real wage growth, a constant real ﬁrst pillar pension, 8 and con-
stant income tax brackets 9 in real terms. In other words, the
growth in these quantities equals the inﬂation rate. 
• During a member’s working life, each year, 10% of the pension
base (income minus deductible) is contributed as the pension
premium. The capital accrues annually with the premium. 
• Pension capital is invested with constant asset allocation over
the life cycle (working life and retirement). 
• The allocation to bonds is assumed to be invested in a port-
folio of safe government bonds with the duration equal to the
member’s remaining investment horizon, capped at 30 years.
If necessary, we use interpolated interest rates in between the
available one, ﬁve, 10 and 30 year rates. 
• For given income paths and asset returns, this approach leads
to a second pillar pension capital w at retirement. At retire-
ment, each year a fraction B of the pension capital w (the
second-pillar beneﬁt) is withdrawn, as follows: 10 
B = w ∗ R t 
1 − (1 + R t ) −L (5)
where R t is the risk-free rate at time t and L is the expected
remaining life expectancy in years. 
• Total after-tax pension beneﬁts are discounted with cumulative
inﬂation to arrive at a net present value of the beneﬁts. 
• Pension plan members retire at the ﬁxed age of 67 and pass
away at the age of 85, for 18 years of pension beneﬁts. 
• To investigate the effects of the age of pension plan popula-
tions, our simulations start at different ages, such that the in-
vestment horizon differs. The amount of capital in our simula-
tions that these older members start with is, for simplicity, the
total premium increased by the risk-free rate from age 25. 
.2. Pension asset allocation 
We calculate the average utility ( Eq. (2) ) that each asset alloca-
ion generates. The asset allocations for which the utility is high-
st are displayed in Table 6 . The last columns show the results in
he absence of social security or a state pension. This is, in princi-
le, the case in countries such as Chile although, for most of these
ountries, means-tested or minimum pensions are offered by the
tate in case the private pension is not suﬃcient. To some extent,
he government provides a put option that could potentially lead
o excessive risk taking in pension portfolios. In our analyses, we
bstract from these government-sponsored minimum pensions and
ssume that the private pension portfolio is the only source of in-
ome. 
Our results in Table 6 show that heterogeneity in risk
version leads to substantially different pension allocations,
iven our model settings. Since we do not allow for leverage
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Table 6 
Optimal allocation of pension plan assets to equity. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income: $30.0 0 0 Income: $50.0 0 0 Income: $70.0 0 0 Without state pension 
γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 
0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 
0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 
1.0 100 100 100 1.0 100 100 100 1.0 100 100 100 1.0 100 100 100 
1.5 100 100 100 1.5 100 100 100 1.5 100 100 100 1.5 100 100 100 
2.0 100 100 100 2.0 100 100 100 2.0 100 100 100 2.0 83 78 78 
2.5 100 100 100 2.5 100 100 100 2.5 100 100 100 2.5 69 64 62 
3.0 100 100 100 3.0 100 100 100 3.0 99 97 99 3.0 59 55 52 
3.5 100 100 100 3.5 100 100 100 3.5 91 89 88 3.5 52 47 44 
4.0 100 100 100 4.0 95 95 98 4.0 85 82 78 4.0 46 42 39 
4.5 100 100 100 4.5 90 89 90 4.5 79 76 71 4.5 42 38 34 
5.0 100 100 100 5.0 86 84 83 5.0 74 71 65 5.0 38 34 31 
5.5 100 100 100 5.5 82 79 77 5.5 70 66 59 5.5 35 31 28 
6.0 100 100 100 6.0 78 75 72 6.0 67 62 55 6.0 33 29 26 
Notes: Allocation to equity (in %) for different levels of (starting) income and in the case of no state pension. Results are given for 
different starting ages and different levels of RRA. 
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11 In Appendix D we display the optimal asset allocation including income taxes. i.e., allocations to equity ﬁnanced with short positions in the risk-
ree asset) in the pension allocation, for γ coeﬃcients of 1.5 and
ower, we see that a 100% allocation to equities gives the highest
tility, even in the absence of a state pension. This is the case for
2% of our respondents. With the presence of a state pension –
hich reduces the risk in the total pension income – more mem-
ers should fully invest in equity. In total, our survey suggests that
pproximately 77% of our respondents should be fully allocated to
quity. 
The ﬁrst part in Table 6 presents the optimal allocation when
 state pension is included (e.g., the Netherlands). The state pen-
ion is assumed to be risk-free. The equity allocation is now 100%
or γ coeﬃcients below four (i.e., gross salary equal to $50,0 0 0).
raditionally, research on asset allocation has focused exclusively
n the risk-bearing part of pensions, normally second-pillar occu-
ational pensions ( Viceira, 2001; Campbell et al., 2003 ). However,
any countries have systems that include a risk-free state pension
r social security (e.g., France, the Netherlands, the United States).
he total pension amount relevant to individuals is the total retire-
ent income, including both the risk-bearing pension and the state
ension, all after taxes. This is the amount that individuals can use
or consumption and that determines their standard of living, that
s, utility. Other studies may ignore ﬁrst pillar pensions, for exam-
le, because of their focus or relative insensitivity to it. However,
ur results show that we need to address the issue, since it has
 major impact on outcomes. We are not aware of other pension
sset allocation studies that explicitly take this issue into account.
his is a novel aspect of our paper. 
Table 6 also shows the differences with respect to income. This
s important for our study on the Netherlands, since the state pen-
ion is a ﬁxed nominal amount, independent of income. The im-
act of the state pension on the optimal asset allocation there-
ore depends on the member’s income. For higher incomes, the
elative importance of the state pension is reduced. For extremely
arge incomes, the state pension is so small that the optimal as-
et allocation is close to the case without a state pension. For
ower incomes, the RRA coeﬃcient is unimportant. For an em-
loyee with $30,0 0 0, the optimal asset allocation is 10 0% to equi-
ies for the range of RRA levels covered in Table 6 . It is worth not-
ng that, for income levels below the subsistence level, this effect
ould carry an additional risk, since utility can behave differently
lose to or below the subsistence level. In the case of the Nether-
ands, the state pension is above the nationally deﬁned subsistence
evel; therefore, this effect is not relevant to our data. For otherountries, however, it may be important to take the subsistence
evel into account when setting the asset allocation. 11 
.3. How costly is having the “wrong” pension asset allocation? 
In the previous sections, we showed that average pension risk
version levels are close to two and that this implies an asset allo-
ation of 100% to equities for a wide range of income levels when
e take state pensions into account. Moreover, we also document
 large amount of heterogeneity in risk aversion within pension
lan populations, and that this heterogeneity is not attributable to
ociodemographics. In this section, we investigate the welfare loss,
iven a single asset allocation for an entire pension plan popula-
ion. To compute the welfare loss, we compare the pension plan al-
ocation to the allocations in Table 6 that yield the highest EU. We
ealize that our concept of optimality only applies within the con-
ext of our model assumptions and, therefore, our welfare losses
re also conditional on the assumption that our model and its pa-
ameters are correct. Therefore, this section is meant as an illustra-
ion rather than a deﬁnite answer to the far bigger question of how
o determine an optimal pension asset allocation. The optimal allo-
ation to equity and, thus, the value of eliciting risk preferences are
onditional on the equity premium that we assume. In Appendix C ,
e conduct a sensitivity analysis to the equity premium and dis-
lay optimal asset allocations for equity premiums that are 2%
nd 4% lower, which are closer to the estimated parameters of
raper (2014) , which are lower than the regulatory parameters for
he equity risk premium. Even though our model might not be
ully correct, we note that the different pension asset allocation
odels estimated by Viceira (2001) and Benzoni et al. (2007) all
how very different asset allocations for investors for different risk
version levels, where higher risk aversion leads to lower alloca-
ions to equity. These are the most important features necessary to
btain results with a similar interpretation to ours. 
We implement the concept of the certainty equivalent
 Arrow and Lind, 2014 ) to determine, in monetary terms, how
uch value a pension scheme provides to an individual, given a
peciﬁc pension asset allocation. The certainty equivalent trans-
orms a distribution of uncertain outcomes into a single value with
robability one that has the same utility. we can thus compare dis-
ributions of pension outcomes, where the differences represent
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Fig. 2. Certainty equivalents. 
Notes: Annual certainty equivalent plotted against allocation to equity for a member enrolling at age 25 with an annual income of $50,0 0 0, not taking the state pension and 
income taxes into account. The certainty equivalent is given for four levels of RRA. The certainty equivalent is highest (optimal allocation) for an allocation of 100%, 83%, 
46%, and 33% for RRA ( γ ) levels 0, 2, 4, and 6, respectively. 
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o  utility levels equal to certain reductions in pension income. This
approach allows us to determine the EU that is lost when an in-
dividual participates in a pension scheme with an exogenously de-
termined uniform pension asset allocation. We use the following
equation: 
E i = (EU i (1 − γi )) 
1 
1 −γi (6)
where CE i is the certainty equivalent of the uncertain total pen-
sion income, EU i is the EU of the total pension income, and γ i is
the (constant) RRA of individual i . This framework can be used to
assess an individual’s pension asset allocation. 
Fig. 2 shows the certainty equivalents for a member who joins
the pension plan at age 25 with an (initial) annual income of
$50,0 0 0 for different levels of RRA, not taking the state pen-
sion into account. The graph shows that the expected annual
value of pension income depends greatly on the chosen asset al-
location. A risk-neutral ( r = 0 ) individual will prefer the highest
expected value, which is given by a 100% allocation to equity.
When the pension plan invests instead 0% in equities, this im-
plies a loss in certainty equivalent of $56,230–$7,750 = $4 8,4 80
each year. For a γ coeﬃcient of six, the loss in certainty equiv-
alent would be $6,500 when the pension plan invests 100% in
equities, whereas the model-implied optimal allocation would
be 33%. 
Whereas Fig. 2 shows the certainty equivalents for four differ-
ent γ coeﬃcients and asset allocations, Table 7 shows the loss in
certainty equivalent for different asset allocations and risk prefer-
ences compared to the optimal asset allocations. This is the loss
that a member experiences from being forced into a given pension
plan asset allocation that deviates from the member’s personal op-
timal allocation. If we take γ equal to two from a given respondentt face value, the loss in certainty equivalent for a member in a
ension plan with an allocation of 40% in equities is $7,655 per
ear, or, stated differently, about two month’s salaries. Certainty
quivalent losses are typically smaller for higher γ valus but typ-
cally still exceed one month’s salary for each γ value when the
ember’s desired and pension scheme’s actual allocation are sub-
tantially different. Com parison of the welfare losses between the
ituation with and without a state pension (left and right panels,
espectively, in Table 7 ) shows that including the state pension in-
reases preferences for higher allocations to equity and, thereby,
eads to larger welfare losses for lower allocations to equity for
isk-averse individuals. 
The analyses above are still somewhat hypothetical cases. Now,
e turn to estimating the loss in certainty equivalents for each
ember given the actual asset allocation in the pension plan the
ember is participating in and taking into account the state pen-
ion in the Netherlands. Fig. 3 shows the loss in certainty equiv-
lents (left axis) for members in the ﬁve company pension plans
hat participated in the survey, dependent on the risk preferences
f the members. The certainty equivalents hold for a member who
oins the pension plan at age 25 with an initial annual income of
50,0 0 0. The bars (right axis) present the total proportion of mem-
ers in each of the respective ranges of γ . The results show that
very asset allocation in our study is too safe given the preferences
f pension plan members. This is due to the safe state pension,
hich induces even the most risk-averse members to favor more
isk than is actually taken in the pension plans. This holds espe-
ially for the relatively large proportion of members who are risk-
eutral or who have relatively little risk aversion. 
Using the same method, we can classify the respondents of
ur survey into different groups, depending on age, income, pen-
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Table 7 
Loss in certainty equivalent. 
Allocation Including state pension Without state pension 
to equity γ = 0 γ = 2 γ = 4 γ = 6 γ = 0 γ = 2 γ = 4 γ = 6 
0% 27,912 13,520 8344 5956 4 8,4 84 9573 4058 2525 
10% 26,618 12,275 7145 4798 46,798 8052 2685 1,288 
20% 25,046 10,853 5851 3615 44,726 6463 1488 414 
30% 23,166 9285 4534 2502 42,182 4880 592 17 
40% 21,008 7655 3291 1550 39,064 3389 90 142 
50% 18,587 6044 2204 818 35,252 2081 29 753 
60% 15,870 4509 1321 326 30,604 1041 404 1749 
70% 12,785 3100 663 62 24,956 337 1163 2984 
80% 9232 1858 235 3 18,118 18 2221 4283 
90% 5054 815 27 116 9878 100 3475 5487 
100% 0 0 20 367 0 577 4822 6498 
Notes: Loss in certainty equivalent per year (in $) of different asset allocations and risk preferences 
compared to the optimal asset allocation. Values are given for a member aged 25 with initial an- 
nual income of $50,0 0 0. Left panel represents welfare loss in the situation with a state pension and 
progression income taxes. The right panel represents welfare loss in the situation without a state 
pension and income taxes. 
Fig. 3. Loss in certainty equivalent. 
Notes: Loss in certainty equivalent (in $) for levels of RRA given asset allocation of the respective company pension plans (lines and left axis). Percentage of respondents 
with RRA, truncated at zero (bars and right axis). Certainty equivalents are given for a 25-year-old member, with initial annual income $50,0 0 0 and the state pension of The 
Netherlands. 
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s  ion plan, and risk aversion, and calculate the amount of welfare
n certainty equivalents they lose by being forced into their pen-
ion plan’s asset allocation. The sixth column of Table 8 shows
he average welfare loss for the population for the ﬁve pension
lans elicited with the current asset allocations. On average our
urvey respondents lose 13.76% of their optimal pension income
elfare, about 1.5 to two month’s pension income, from having a
uboptimal asset allocation. These numbers range between 12.00%
nd 18.24% for different pension plans depending on the average
ncome, age, risk aversion, asset allocation, and variation in riskversion within the pension plan. For the sample as a whole the
esults equate to $47.5 million per year, or $6,019 per respondent
er year, on average. 
The welfare losses presented are driven by two factors: the fact
hat the asset allocation does not match the average risk prefer-
nces of the population and the fact that the collective optimal
sset allocation is not equal to each individual’s optimal asset al-
ocation because of risk preference heterogeneity. In our empiri-
al setting, much welfare is lost because the pension plans in our
ample are too conservative for their members’ risk preferences.
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Table 8 
Welfare losses per pension plan. 
Pension Current equity Income (month) Age Relative risk aversion Welfare loss average 
plan allocation Average Average Average St. dev. Total Collective Individual 
1 55% $ 2537 50.1 1.829 1.918 13.25% 12.71% 0.54% 
2 48% $ 2097 53.8 1.985 2.009 12.00% 11.64% 0.36% 
3 40% $ 2168 44.8 2.066 1.724 18.12% 17.36% 0.76% 
4 42% $ 1813 52.2 2.411 1.651 12.47% 12.06% 0.41% 
5 38% $ 2498 48.5 2.205 1.861 18.24% 17.77% 0.47% 
Total $ 2396 50.1 1.926 1.901 13.76% 13.23% 0.53% 
Notes: Welfare losses and sociodemographic information per pension plan with current asset allocations. 
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pThe fact that we can observe individuals’ risk preferences helps
improve the collective ﬁt of the pension plans’ asset allocations.
By increasing the collective allocation to equity, welfare gains can
be made without individualizing the asset allocation. The last
three columns of Table 8 show the welfare losses for the cur-
rent asset allocations compared to the case in which the asset
allocation is set at the collective optimum of 100% equity. The
penultimate last column (average 13.23%) shows the welfare loss
from the ﬁrst factor (collective suboptimal asset allocation across
funds) and last column (average 0.53%) shows the welfare loss
from the second factor (welfare loss through heterogeneity within
a fund). 
Based on our model speciﬁcations and data, total welfare for
the ﬁve pension plans we study can be increased by $46.3 million
per year, or $5,865 per respondent per year, on average, by setting
the allocation at the collective optimum. The value of individual-
izing asset allocations can improve total welfare by an additional
$1.2 million per year, equal to $154 per respondent. The value of
eliciting risk preferences depends strongly on the assumed equity
premium. With the default equity premium and a collective as-
set allocation, there is no value in eliciting risk preferences, since
the optimal allocation for the average respondent ( γ = 1 . 926 ) and
the collective optimum are both an allocation of 100% to equity. In
Section 5.2 , we present the value of eliciting risk preferences for a
number of different model assumptions. 
An ordinary least squares regression with clustered standard er-
rors shows the marginal effect of the measured RRA of the pension
plan population and the current allocation to equity (each addi-
tional unit in the average γ is associated with a 0.23% lower allo-
cation to equity). Average income appears to be a more important
determinant of the asset allocation (a 10% higher average income
is associated with a 1.0% higher allocation to equity). The effect
of average γ on the asset allocation is larger for the composite
score ( −0.23%) than for the MLC results ( −0.14%). Since there are
only ﬁve observations of the asset allocation the statistical power
(signiﬁcance) of the regressions is low. The relation between the
pension plan’s average risk aversion and the allocation to equity is
illustrated in Fig. 4 . The ﬁgure shows that differences across mem-
bers in pension domain risk preferences do appear to be a relevant
determinant for pension plan managers’ asset allocation decisions
for the ﬁve pension plans that we study. 
The simulations show that most of the welfare losses that we
ﬁnd are the result of an allocation to equity that is too low. The re-
sults demonstrate that, in the cases of the ﬁve pension plans that
we study, pension plan managers can satisfy most members by in-
creasing the asset allocation. Allocating (close to all) assets to eq-
uity (or other higher risk-categories) will increase the welfare of
almost all members. However, while average welfare will increase
in this case, many members will still face substantial welfare losses
(see Table 8 ), since the collective asset allocation can never accom-
modate the heterogeneity in optimal asset allocations due to het-
erogeneous risk preferences. . Discussion 
.1. Implications for academic research 
Our research has several implications for the academic research
genda on pension asset allocation. The use of unique data from
894 members in ﬁve Dutch pension plans allows us to provide
eal-world empirical insight on the degree of explained as well as
nexplained heterogeneity in pension plan members’ risk prefer-
nces. The results conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings that a large component
f individuals’ pension risk preference is idiosyncratic (e.g., due
o unobserved individual or environmental factors ( Grable et al.,
004; Cesarini et al., 2009 )) and only knowable to investment
anagers after engaging in a dialog with the individual (i.e., pref-
rence elicitation). The levels of RRA that we ﬁnd are substantially
ower than is often assumed in papers discussing (optimal) asset
llocation (e.g., Viceira, 2001; Campbell et al., 2003 . However, the
evels do correspond with the results of most papers eliciting ﬁ-
ancial risk preferences from individuals (e.g. Mankiw and Zeldes,
991; Barsky et al., 1997; Holt and Laury, 2002 ). This implies a
arge gap between the risk preferences elicited from individuals
nd those used in setting asset allocations. A fruitful area for fur-
her research could be to better explain this gap. Perhaps this in-
reased understanding will lead to questionnaires better suited to
licit pension risk aversion, change the way risk aversion can be
ncorporated in theoretical pension asset allocation models, or use
he elicited risk preferences directly in existing pension asset allo-
ation models. 
These results together with simulation-based evaluations of the
mpact of risk preference heterogeneity also provide new theoret-
cal (and real-world) insight into the contingent nature of optimal
ension asset allocation. We highlight the importance of pension
lan members’ characteristics (i.e., time to retirement, income, and
isk preference heterogeneity) and pension market conditions (i.e.,
he presence of a state pension) in determining an optimal pen-
ion asset allocation strategy. Future research could address other
mportant contingencies and further investigate the interplay be-
ween risk preference heterogeneity and the environment in which
his heterogeneity occurs in determining optimal asset allocation
trategies. 
The new augmented lottery choice method tailored to individ-
al pension risk preference elicitation that we have developed pro-
ides a useful balance between a normative economic basis and
ndividual-level speciﬁcity in risk preferences. Because the lottery
hoice questions are personalized to each individual’s pension in-
ome based on current income and age (i.e., years to retirement),
ndividuals could also directly take into account their personal sit-
ation. Augmentation with two other risk preference elicitation
ethods reduces the level of measurement error in the risk pref-
rence measure and improves robustness. Nevertheless, further re-
earch on methods to reduce measurement error in eliciting risk
references could be warranted. 
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Fig. 4. Scatterplot of pension plans average risk aversion and allocation to equity. 
Notes: Dotted line represents linear trend line. 
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s  Traditionally, the research on asset allocation has focused exclu-
ively on the risk-bearing part of pensions, normally second-pillar
ccupational pensions ( Viceira, 2001; Campbell et al., 2003 ). How-
ver, many countries have systems that include a risk-free ﬁrst-
illar pension (e.g., France, the Netherlands, the United States),
uch as a state pension (e.g., social security). Our ﬁndings un-
erline the importance of taking this context into account. They
lso provide a reﬁnement of the conclusions of Bucciol and
iniaci (2015) , in that we ﬁnd that higher state pensions increase
he allocation to equity in the optimal asset allocation of second
illar pension plans. 
.2. Managerial and policy implications 
The value of eliciting risk preferences to set the optimal asset
llocation depends on a number of contingency variables, which
e summarize in Table 9 in a framework for pension plan man-
gers. This table provides a qualitative overview of how the value
f eliciting risk preferences depends on pension plan member
haracteristics and the pension market in which the plan operates.
Pension plans that have an older population, with many retired
embers, will ﬁnd that the value of eliciting risk preferences is
ower. The investment horizon is short, and therefore the effect of
ariations in asset allocation is lower. However, the value of elicit-
ng risk preferences for the youngest members is also lower, since
hese member exhibit less heterogeneity in optimal asset alloca-
ions. Pension plans that service a population with relatively high
ncomes compared to their state pensions or those without a state
ension (e.g., in countries such as Chile) directly affect a large pro-
ortion of individuals’ retirement income. Therefore, the impact
f asset allocation on members’ retirement incomes is larger for
hese plans, which increases the value of eliciting risk preferences.
n countries with relatively high state pensions (e.g., France), the
alue of risk preference elicitation is likely to be lower. Market
onditions, especially equity premium, also inﬂuence the value of
licitation, because they affect the trade-off between equity andxed income. With high equity premiums, equity becomes domi-
ant and, since all members should (almost) fully invest in equity
nder these conditions, the value of elicitation is reduced. Finally,
or pension plan populations with a greater risk preference hetero-
eneity (e.g., in industry-wide pension plans that combine many
ifferent types of plan members), the variation in optimal asset al-
ocations is larger, which also makes the elicitation of risk prefer-
nces more valuable. 
Table 7 shows that all of the pension plans in our sample have
sset allocations that are too conservative for the vast majority of
heir members. This implies that, within our framework, pension
lans can improve welfare by increasing the allocation to equity.
owever, since risk preferences are heterogeneous, a single asset
llocation will always lead to the welfare losses of some of the
embers. To illustrate the framework with a numerical example,
e assess the impact of risk preference heterogeneity for the case
n which the asset allocation is matched to the average pension
lan member. 
Table 10 shows the value of customized individual asset allo-
ation in a number of different situations compared to a strategy
f optimizing for the mean level of risk preferences in our sam-
le (i.e., γ = 2 ). This would be an alternative, simpler approach for
ension funds compared to setting risk preferences; it matches the
lan population average but accepts welfare losses due to hetero-
eneity in risk preferences. Hence, these results reﬂect the value
f eliciting risk preferences and customized individual asset alloca-
ions. 
Table 10 shows that the effect of time to retirement (age) is
wofold. With longer periods to retirement the heterogeneity in
ptimal asset allocations is lower, which reduces the value of cus-
omized asset allocations. However, with shorter periods to retire-
ent the impact of different asset allocations on pension beneﬁts
ecreases, which also reduces the value of customized asset allo-
ations. 
With larger incomes, the relative size of the risk-bearing pen-
ion increases because the state pension is the same amount for
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Table 9 
Cost-beneﬁt framework of eliciting risk preferences. 
Level of contingency variable 
Contingency Low High 
variable 
Plan population 
Age A young population should invest in equity An old population may differ in 
anyway, so risk preferences are less relevant. terms of optimal asset allocation, 
However, due to the longer horizon differences however, due to a shorter period, 
become more pronounced the effect is less pronounced. 
Heterogeneity For a homogeneous population, elicitation Variety in risk preferences can make 
may not be worth the while. A sample may elicitation worthwhile. In large, 
suﬃce. Homogeneous populations may occur widely deﬁned industry-wide pension 
in niche industry-wide pension funds, or funds (e.g., civil servants), 
company pension funds. heterogeneity is likely to be large. 
Pension market 
Income State pension is paramount, so asset State pension is less relevant, so 
allocation is less relevant. This holds for asset allocation, and therefore risk 
low paid workers and/or in Beveridgean preferences, become more important. 
pension systems. This holds for highly paid workers 
and/or in Bismarckian pension 
systems. 
Equity premium Large variety of optimal asset allocations, Equity mostly optimal, so risk 
thus preferences are more important preferences are not relevant 
Table 10 
Value of eliciting risk preferences. 
Variables Maximum welfare loss 
Time to retirement 0 10 21 31 42 
(years) 0.38% 0.62% 0.65% 0.40% 0.27% 
Income (per year) $20,0 0 0 $30,0 0 0 $40,0 0 0 $50,0 0 0 $60,0 0 0 
0.00% 0.10% 0.42% 0.69% 0.81% 
Heterogeneity γ 2.0–2.0 1.5–3.0 1.0–4.0 0.5–5.0 0.0–6.0 
0.00% 0.01% 0.08% 0.28% 0.53% 
Equity premium Default -4% Default -3% Default -2% Default -1% Default 
2.22% 2.69% 2.11% 0.90% 0.53% 
Notes: Average welfare loss as a ratio of total optimal pension income. 
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b  everybody. This increases the impact of different asset allocations
but also increases the heterogeneity in optimal asset allocations.
Therefore, higher incomes – or lower state pensions – increase the
value of customized asset allocations. 
In the absence of intraplan heterogeneity in risk preferences,
there is no value in eliciting risk preferences. As risk preferences
become more heterogeneous, optimal asset allocations become
more heterogeneous, and the value of eliciting risk preferences in-
creases. Finally, with higher equity premiums the heterogeneity in
optimal asset allocations decreases, as more members prefer full
equity allocations. Therefore lower equity premiums, with more
heterogeneous asset allocations, lead to more valuable risk pref-
erence elicitations and asset allocation customizations. When the
equity premium is very low or absent, most members will pre-
fer no risk taking and the value of eliciting risk preferences de-
creases again. Including ambiguity aversion in our analyses would
have similar effects on asset allocation as having a lower equity
premium. Therefore, if real-life pension asset allocation is better
described by a combination of risk and ambiguity aversion, this
would likely lead to effects similar to those of using a lower eq-
uity premium in the current model. 
5.3. Limitations and further research 
Several limitations and potentially fruitful extensions of our
research are worth noting. Our results are based on cross sec-
tional data. With panel data, more research and management ques-
tions could be answered. Future research could shed more light
on the time dependency of risk preferences. This work is rel-
evant to pension plan management as well, because such timeependency inﬂuences the frequency of conducting risk prefer-
nce surveys among plan members. For instance, if risk preferences
hange due to large events, such as the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, sur-
eys need to be repeated every couple of years. If the risk pref-
rences of individuals are stable, then a new survey is warranted
nly if the plan population changes substantially. Since risk prefer-
nce surveys are costly for the pension fund, such considerations
re material. 
We explicitly model pension members’ normative risk prefer-
nces using EU with constant RRA. Normative risk preferences
an deviate from revealed risk preferences due to well-known
easurement irregularities, such as probability weighting, loss or
isappointment aversion, and the reﬂection effect. The elicitation
ethods are selected to minimize measurement bias, but we do
ot adjust the results in order to address potential behavioral ef-
ects. To explain the revealed preferences, other utility functions
an be used, including behavioral effects such as loss or disap-
ointment aversion. We leave the impact of applying such more
ehavioral models on optimal pension asset allocation to future re-
earch. 
Our analysis is set in an individual pension asset allocation set-
ing with constant asset allocations. Although this setting yields
he clearest theoretical insights, some adjustment is necessary to
llow the results to be applied to individual pension plans with
ife-cycle options and to collective pension plans. Additionally,
dding more asset categories and ﬁnancial derivatives or variable
nnuities ( Mahayni and Schneider, 2012 ) would yield more com-
lete insight. 
Individual pension plans, such as DC plans, often allow mem-
ers to invest in line with a life-cycle model. Life-cycle models
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Fig. 5. Histograms of relative risk aversion. 
Notes: Results are given for plans 1 to 5, respectively, and total population. The dashed line represents risk neutrality and the solid line represents the population’s median 
RRA score. 
Table 11 
Allocation to equity with equity premium: default - 2%. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income: $30.0 0 0 Income: $50.0 0 0 Income: $70.0 0 0 Without state pension 
γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 
0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 
0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 
1.0 100 100 100 1.0 100 100 100 1.0 100 100 100 1.0 98 97 100 
1.5 100 100 100 1.5 100 100 100 1.5 100 100 100 1.5 72 69 70 
2.0 100 100 100 2.0 100 100 100 2.0 91 91 94 2.0 57 54 52 
2.5 100 100 100 2.5 92 92 99 2.5 81 80 79 2.5 48 44 42 
3.0 100 100 100 3.0 82 84 87 3.0 74 71 68 3.0 41 37 35 
3.5 100 100 100 3.5 79 77 78 3.5 68 64 60 3.5 36 32 30 
4.0 100 100 100 4.0 74 71 70 4.0 62 59 53 4.0 32 29 26 
4.5 100 100 100 4.5 69 67 64 4.5 58 54 48 4.5 29 26 23 
5.0 98 100 100 5.0 65 62 59 5.0 54 51 44 5.0 26 23 21 
5.5 95 96 100 5.5 62 59 54 5.5 51 47 40 5.5 24 22 19 
6.0 92 93 100 6.0 59 56 50 6.0 48 44 37 6.0 23 20 17 
Notes: Allocation to equity (in %) for different levels of (starting) income and in the case of no state pension. Results are given for 
different starting ages and different levels of RRA. 
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Table 12 
Allocation to equity with equity premium: default - 4%. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income: $30.0 0 0 Income: $50.0 0 0 Income: $70.0 0 0 Without state pension 
γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 
0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 
0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 0.5 89 93 100 
1.0 100 100 100 1.0 87 91 100 1.0 77 78 86 1.0 55 53 57 
1.5 100 100 100 1.5 75 76 85 1.5 64 63 65 1.5 40 38 38 
2.0 96 100 100 2.0 66 66 70 2.0 56 54 52 2.0 32 29 28 
2.5 89 93 100 2.5 59 58 60 2.5 49 47 43 2.5 26 24 22 
3.0 84 86 100 3.0 54 52 52 3.0 44 42 37 3.0 23 20 19 
3.5 79 81 94 3.5 50 47 46 3.5 40 38 33 3.5 20 18 16 
4.0 95 76 86 4.0 46 43 41 4.0 37 34 29 4.0 18 16 14 
4.5 72 72 80 4.5 43 40 37 4.5 34 32 26 4.5 16 14 12 
5.0 69 69 74 5.0 40 37 34 5.0 32 29 24 5.0 15 13 11 
5.5 66 65 69 5.5 38 35 31 5.5 30 27 22 5.5 14 12 10 
6.0 63 62 65 6.0 35 33 28 6.0 28 26 20 6.0 13 11 9 
Notes: Allocation to equity (in %) for different levels of (starting) income and in the case of no state pension. Results are given for 
different starting ages and different levels of RRA. 
Table 13 
Optimal allocation of pension assets to equity. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pension without Pension with Pension with 
state pension state pension state pension 
before taxes before taxes after taxes 
γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 γ 25 46 67 
0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 0.0 100 100 100 
0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 0.5 100 100 100 
1.0 100 100 100 1.0 100 100 100 1.0 100 100 100 
1.5 100 100 100 1.5 100 100 100 1.5 100 100 100 
2.0 83 78 78 2.0 100 100 100 2.0 100 100 100 
2.5 69 64 62 2.5 100 100 100 2.5 100 100 100 
3.0 59 55 52 3.0 100 100 100 3.0 100 100 100 
3.5 52 47 44 3.5 98 98 100 3.5 100 100 100 
4.0 46 42 39 4.0 92 91 94 4.0 95 95 98 
4.5 42 38 34 4.5 87 85 85 4.5 90 89 90 
5.0 38 34 31 5.0 82 80 78 5.0 86 84 83 
5.5 35 31 28 5.5 78 76 72 5.5 82 79 77 
6.0 33 29 26 6.0 75 72 67 6.0 78 75 72 
Notes: Optimal allocation to equity (in %) in the case of no state pension and income taxes, in the 
case of a state pension and no income taxes, and in the case of a state pension and income taxes. 
Results are given for different starting ages and levels of RRA. Starting income ﬁxed at $50,0 0 0. 
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l  adapt asset allocations to investor age. Individuals farther from
retirement are assigned a high allocation to equity and, as the time
horizon declines, allocation to equity decreases. This mechanism is
designed to compensate for the stronger effect of equity on the
riskiness of the ﬁnal pension income in shorter investment hori-
zons or, deﬁned differently, this shift is due to the decline in hu-
man capital compared to ﬁnancial capital (i.e., where human cap-
ital acts as a diversiﬁcation mechanism) ( Viceira, 2001 ). This is in
line with our ﬁnding that pension members who start later have
lower optimal allocations to equity. Since life-cycles can be used to
decrease the effect of risk on pension income, equity may be even
more desirable when life-cycle timing is allowed. Adding life-cycles
to our model would be an interesting avenue for further research. 
In addition, in some countries, members in individual pension
plans are obligated to convert (part of their) pension capital to an-
nuities on the retirement date. This reduces the amount of risk
that retirees can take and leads to signiﬁcant welfare losses ac-
cording to our model (i.e., due to the positive allocation to equity
for 67-year-olds). Such a policy inﬂuences optimal asset allocation
and will presumably transfer risk from the retirement phase to the
active phase. Such policies also add additional interest rate risk
for members, who become highly sensitive to the interest rate on
the day of conversion (normally the retirement date). Adding bothhese mechanisms to the model would increase its practical us-
bility; however, optimizing this model in this way would be com-
utationally demanding given the very large number of resulting
ossibilities. 
Collective pension plans generally provide only a single asset
llocation for all their members. As our results show, the het-
rogeneity in risk preferences and sociodemographic characteris-
ics makes the single asset allocation suboptimal for many mem-
ers, who will face welfare losses. Another difference in collective
ension plans is the possibility of employing intergenerational risk
haring ( Chen et al., 2016 ). Employing intergenerational risk shar-
ng reduces risk through longer time diversiﬁcation. Further re-
earch could reveal whether the beneﬁts of collective schemes,
uch as intergenerational risk sharing, outweigh the welfare losses
hat result from the mismatch between a homogeneous asset allo-
ation and heterogeneous risk preferences. 
In the case of collective pension plans with a single asset
llocation, the question becomes how to use risk preferences in
etermining the single asset allocation. By deﬁnition, single asset
llocation results in welfare losses when risk preferences are het-
rogeneous. Choosing the asset allocation that minimizes aggre-
ated welfare losses could be one option to cope with this prob-
em; however, that would weight higher incomes more heavily,
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12 For more detailed information, see the report by the Dutch Association of 
Industry-wide Pension Funds titled “The Dutch Pension System: An Overview of the 
Key Aspects.”hich could be considered socially undesirable. Other options in-
lude weighting the optimal individual asset allocations with the
umber of members or accumulated beneﬁts. Each choice weighs
peciﬁc income and age groups individually; the choice mainly de-
ends on pension plan–speciﬁc preferences. 
Further, our results show a large discrepancy between optimal
sset allocation and the current asset allocations of the pension
lans studied ( Fig. 3 ). Several factors could explain this, in addition
o previously mentioned points. First, the horizons of pension plan
anagers and regulators are far shorter than those of most mem-
ers. Legislation often requires pension plan managers to focus on
hort-term (under 10 years) nominal performance measures, such
s the coverage rate and pension cuts. The members (in our model)
alue only actual pension beneﬁts. Members are thus, more often
han not, assumed to have a horizon exceeding 20 years. This mis-
atch could implicitly lead to myopic loss aversion ( Benartzi and
haler, 1995 ); by reducing year-to-year volatility, long-run volatil-
ty may be suboptimal. Second, the interests of other stakeholders,
uch as the sponsoring company, supervisors, and politicians, could
nﬂuence asset allocation. However, since pension members are the
rimary stakeholders of pension plans, integrating their long-term
references more strongly into the decision process of the (collec-
ive) asset allocation could substantially increase their welfare. 
We hope that our research can provide a fruitful next step
n developing insights into when and how to elicit pension plan
ember risk preferences to make more informed decisions about
ow to match members’ risk preferences with pension plan invest-
ent allocations. 
. Conclusion 
This study measures risk preferences in the pension domain of
894 members in ﬁve Dutch pension plans, using an augmented
ersion of the MLC method via an online survey. By combining
ata from multiple risk preference elicitation methods in a com-
osite score, we assign personal values of RRA to the members in
hese pension plans and overcome several diﬃculties related to in-
ividual measures of risk preference (i.e., dominated choices and
easurement noise). 
Our results show great heterogeneity in pension income risk
references. Risk preferences tend to vary both within the popu-
ation of a pension plan and between the populations of different
ension plans, in both the level and variation of risk preferences.
ariation between pension plan populations is mainly driven by
ifferences in sociodemographic characteristics, such as age, gen-
er, and income and, to a lesser extent, by potential selection ef-
ects of speciﬁc industries or employers. Sociodemographic infor-
ation and pension plan membership account for only 5.6% of the
ariation, so the modeling of risk preferences with observable so-
iodemographic information cannot replace the measurement of
ndividual risk preferences. 
Our simulation quantiﬁes the importance of risk preferences for
ptimal asset allocation. Allocation to equity in the optimal asset
llocation changes by up to 30% in our baseline model. Inclusion
f the state’s old age pension substantially increases the allocation
o equity, since it increases the security of the total retirement in-
ome. Other variables that inﬂuence optimal asset allocation (given
isk preferences) are income (via the relative size of the state’s old
ge pension), age, and the equity premium. 
Further, suboptimal asset allocation leads to signiﬁcant wel-
are losses to pension plan members. With our model assump-
ions the respondents of our survey lose, on average, 13.76% of
heir pension welfare by being forced into a suboptimal asset al-
ocation, given their personal preferences and situations. Increasing
he level of the collective asset allocation to the collective optimum
an increase welfare by 13.23%. The remaining 0.53% can only bechieved by allowing members to customize their asset allocation
o their personal risk preferences. 
Finally, the value of eliciting risk preferences and customizable
ension asset allocations depend on a number of pension plan
haracteristics and market expectations. First, higher levels of in-
ome, compared to the state pension, increase the effect of asset
llocation on total pension income and therefore increase the value
f elicitation. Second, both lower equity premiums and greater het-
rogeneity in risk preference increase the variance of optimal asset
llocations and the value of elicitation. Finally, age inﬂuences the
alue of elicitation through the investment horizon. Shorter pe-
iods to retirement cause more variation in optimal asset alloca-
ions; however, as the investment period becomes shorter, differ-
nces due to asset allocation become less pronounced. 
ppendix A. The pension system in the Netherlands 
Our online survey is conducted by ﬁve pension funds that oper-
te in the Netherlands. In this appendix, we describe the essential
eatures of the pension system in the Netherlands and compare it
ith the pension system in the United States where appropriate. 12 
his should clarify the context of the members in our survey, and
ndicate how our empirical results can be used by pension funds,
egulators, and other stakeholders. 
The three pillars of the pension system are organized as fol-
ows. The ﬁrst pillar consists of social security pensions organized
y the government and are primarily pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced. The
ension is different for one- and two-person households but, oth-
rwise, each inhabitant receives a ﬁxed amount, irrespective of
orking history. This amount should cover essential expenses and
hould prevent extreme poverty among the elderly. The second pil-
ar is work related, voluntarily organized by a company or industry,
nd required to be capital ﬁnanced by law. Participation is semi-
andatory if employed by a company or industry with a pension
lan, which means that most Dutch employees are covered by a
econd pillar pension plan. The ﬁve pension funds that participated
n our online survey offer these second pillar pension plans. In the
hird pillar, an individual may set up an individual pension savings
r investment account with a bank or insurance company. In the
nited States, this is often referred to as an individual retirement
ccount. The average replacement rate in 2012 was estimated by
tatistics Netherlands (CBS) to be 39% from the ﬁrst pillar and 30%
rom the second pillar. 
The second pillar pension plan is part of the negotiations be-
ween employer and employees. This means that it can range from
 traditional deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) scheme, in which the employer
ears all the risks related to the ﬁnal- or average-wage pension
hat is promised, to a deﬁned contribution (DC) scheme, with in-
estment choices and/or contribution rates delegated by the indi-
idual. In the United States, many civil servants seem to be part
f a DB pension plan, whereas corporate plans these days are
ostly DC plans, among which 401(k) plans have become popu-
ar. However, as Ponds and Van Riel (2009) indicate, most pension
lans in the Netherlands contain risk-sharing elements between
he employer(s) and employees, which is uncommon in the United
tates. Moreover, over the past decades, the amount of risk borne
y the employee has increased considerably. These risk-sharing
greements can consist of several elements. First, most pension
lans make cost-of-living adjustments to accrued payments (in-
ation compensation), unless the pension plan is not suﬃciently
unded. Second, when underfunding is severe and prolonged, nom-
nal pension beneﬁts can also be reduced. This effectively means
224 G.A.G. Alserda, B.G.C. Dellaert and L. Swinkels et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance 101 (2019) 206–225 
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D  that the contributions from the employer(s) to the pension plan
are capped, which makes corporate pension expenses more pre-
dictable and less procyclical. In case corporate pension plan con-
tributions are ﬁxed for a period of at least ﬁve years, they can be
considered DC plans according to International Financial Reporting
Standards. Industry-wide pension plans are considered to be col-
lective DC plans, unless the deﬁcits in the pension plan can be eas-
ily attributed to an employer (DB). This means that, even though
the term career-average pension plans suggests a DB, their risk-
sharing arrangements make them closer to DC plans. Note that ex-
cess funding is typically kept as a ﬁnancial reserve for future gen-
erations to reduce volatility in pension outcomes between genera-
tions. 
Pension funds are governed by a board of trustees that should
make sure that the pension plan is fair for all stakeholders. To en-
sure this, at most half of the board of trustees can be appointed by
the employer(s), while the others are appointed by the employees
or retirees. The strategic pension plan asset allocation is set by the
board of trustees, where pension contributions by employer and
employees are traded off against pension outcomes. This trade-
off takes both the level and variations around this level into ac-
count. For the pension outcomes, the possibility of cost-of-living
adjustments are considered, as well as possible nominal pension
reductions. Note that, if the second pillar offered classic DB pen-
sion plans, that is, plans in which all the investment and longevity
risk is borne by an employer that cannot default on its pension
promise, our analysis on individual risk preferences in the pen-
sion domain would not be necessary. In such a case, only the em-
ployer’s risk preferences would matter, since the members’ retire-
ment income would be risk free. 
Appendix B. Individual method responses ( Fig. 5 ) 
Appendix C. Effect of the equity premium on optimal asset 
allocation 
The equity premium largely determines the beneﬁts of hold-
ing equity. Higher equity premiums make equity more attrac-
tive and normally lead to higher (optimal) allocations to equity.
Tables 11 and 12 show the optimal asset allocation for differ-
ent levels of the equity premium. Table 11 shows the allocation
with a 2% reduction in the equity premium that follows from
historical data. In this case the beneﬁts of measuring risk prefer-
ences increase, since the allocation to equity declines and, there-
fore heterogeneity in optimal asset allocations increases. Addi-
tionally, measuring risk preferences can substantially decrease
allocation mismatches and the welfare losses resulting therefrom.
Finally, Table 12 presents the optimal allocation in the case of a
pessimistic equity premium of that is 4% reduced compared to the
default equity premium. The heterogeneity in optimal asset alloca-
tions is the highest in this case. 
Appendix D. Effect of the state pension and taxes on optimal 
asset allocation 
Two variables that inﬂuence retirement income are the pres-
ence of a state pension and taxes in a pension system. A state pen-
sion, such as social security, creates a risk-free minimum, which
reduces the riskiness of the total pension income. Therefore, given
total pension risk preferences, members will want to increase the
riskiness (i.e., allocation to equity) of the risk-bearing pension in
the presence of a state pension. Taxes reduce the amount of the
total pension income. Depending on the kind of system, taxation
can result in divergent pension amount outcomes. Progressive sys-
tems will (on average) tax higher pensions more than they will taxower pensions. This will theoretically inﬂuence the costs and ben-
ﬁts of risk and, therefore, asset allocation. 
Column (1) of Table 13 presents the optimal asset allocation
n the case without a state pension or income taxes. Column (2)
resents the optimal asset allocation given a state pension (Dutch
ld age state pension) and no income taxes and, ﬁnally, Column (3)
resents the optimal asset allocation with the same state pension
nd income taxes (Dutch progressive taxes). The results show that
he presence of a state pension substantially increases the alloca-
ion to equity, by up to 56%. Income taxes, on the other hand, have
nly minimal effects. In the presence of income taxes, the alloca-
ion to equity increases by a maximum of 5%. Progressive income
axes thus have a (limited) risk-reducing effect. 
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